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POOR RELIEF IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND    The amount of 
charitable provision administered by the monasteries of the later Middle Ages has long received the 
attention of historians exploring pre-industrial social-welfare systems. Most nineteenth-century 
commentators remained skeptical about the value of monastic poor relief: “The charity distributed by the 
monks . . . was to a great extent unorganized and indiscriminate and did nearly as much to increase 
beggars as to relieve them.”
1  
  No systematic study of monastic charity was carried out, however, until Savine’s analysis in 
1909. Using the national Church tax assessment of 1535, known as the Valor Ecclesiasticus 
(hereinafter Valor), Savine calculated that the average proportion of monastic national gross income 
spent on poor relief was c. 2.5 percent -- a figure that remained influential on historiography until as 
recently as 1998. Among those who revised this interpretation, Harvey outlined the provision of the 
sixteenth-century Westminster Abbey where the monks distributed the large sum of £400 per annum -- 
about 10 percent of the Abbey’s gross income -- in various forms of relief to the poorer inhabitants of 
Westminster and London.
2  
Several early modern historians have suggested a revision of the traditional view. According to 
Slack, 
The dissolution of the monasteries, chantries, religious guilds and fraternities in the 1530s and 1540s 
radically reduced existing sources of charity. The real aid which they had provided for the poor was 










its destruction left a real vacuum. It has been estimated that monasteries alone provided £6,500 a 
year in alms before 1537; and that sum was not made good by private benefactions until after 1580.
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If Slack is correct and charitable relief was indeed higher than Savine’s estimates indicate, the disruption 
in aid caused by the Dissolution may have had profound effects on the lives and wellbeing of the English 
poor.   
  The Valor originally consulted by Savine, which contains detailed information about the income 
and expenditure of most of the religious houses and many of the hospitals in England and Wales, is an 
indispensable source for the economic condition of the religious houses on the eve of the Dissolution. 
But it is also problematic. First, it is incomplete.  Because data collected from houses in Berkshire, 
Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Northumberland, Rutland, and parts of Yorkshire do not survive 
in the original returns, only a severely truncated accounting of the taxable net income for these counties 
is available. Second, religious houses appear to have underassessed their gross income at times. Certain 
houses in Lancashire were especially prone to do so. Third, and perhaps most important, the political 
situation in 1535 created a sociopolitical bias in the members of the commissions assigned to undertake 
the valuation.  
This study allows for these inaccuracies.  It also takes into consideration the effects of 
topographical and regional aspects of house location on levels of poor relief, as well as any differences 










the poor relief offered by Tudor monasteries, and provide support for the argument thatSavine’s 
estimate  was too low.
4  
This study models any potential bias in recorded poor relief as a function of the characteristics 
of the data collectors themselves; such characteristics should be unrelated to the poor relief that the 
religious houses actually provided.   We estimate the amount of charitable provision recorded in the 
Valor as a function of house and county characteristics, and our estimated bias function.  Using our 
regression estimates, we then predict what the actual charitable provision would have been in the 
absence of bias.  In other words, we use our parameter estimates to predict actual poor relief when our 
bias function is set at zero.  This approach also allows us to test statistically whether the sociopolitical 
structure of the commissions should have made any difference in the analysis of this data source. 
 
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND   Henry VIII’s break with Rome entailed a 
suppression of the Roman Catholic monastic network.  In 1535, the Crown was almost certainly well 
advanced in its plans to take possession of the monasteries’ goods and lands. Between 1536 and 1540, 
almost every monastery in the country was dissolved, closely followed in the early 1540s by a majority 
of the hospitals, which had come to be seen as special types of religious house.
5  
  The Valor was the outcome of a parliamentary bill of 1534—a year before the suppression--
that procured for the Crown 10 percent of all ecclesiastical income. County commissioners assigned to 










income of each house--including its legally indentured rents, stipends, and pensions—all customary or 
legally indentured alms. The income net of charity was the sum upon which the religious houses were 
taxed.
6 
  The alms recorded in the Valor represented an institution of monastic charity that had evolved 
over many centuries.  By the early sixteenth century, it had become an effective system of social welfare. 
Distributions took place within access-controlled almonry courtyards usually on a daily or weekly basis. 
The recipients were often specified as the local poor -- that is, householders who could be identified as 
genuinely in need, sometimes by tokens that they carried to exchange for provisions. The Valor also 
includes the cost of providing indoor relief in hospitals (whether or not administered by a monastery), 
and monastic almonries.
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  In theory, this detailed document should permit a quantitative assessment of its value from the 
commissioners’ returned surveys.  However, Savine’s conclusion that the monasteries contributed up to 
2.5 percent of their total income to charity is unrealistic for several reasons: 
(1) He did not reduce gross income to net income before calculating the percentage of each house’s 
poor relief (that is, he neglected rents, stipends, and pensions). (2) He discounted all of the central 
government’s disallowances of charitable contributions, justifiable or not.  (3) He inexplicably omitted 
forty-seven alms-giving monasteries from his analysis--two of which were among the most generous, 










included all of the monasteries for which no poor relief is recorded. (4) Finally, he omitted almost all of 
the hospitals from his analysis.
8   
This last point highlights one of the main problems with taking the Valor evidence at face value. 
The Valor lists 277 houses and hospitals as providing no charitable provision at all, and a further 69 for 
which no details beyond net income survive.  Many of the small, underendowed houses so listed 
probably had little surplus revenue available for charity after expenses, but at least some of the 152 
institutions with an annual net income greater than £50 certainly did. For example, the legally binding 
cartulary entries at Edington Priory in Wiltshire and Newnham Priory in Bedfordshire attest to their 
charitable donations, as do the internal account rolls at the large, Benedictine Tavistock Abbey in 
Devon.  Moreover, records for some of the lesser houses (those valued at under £200) dissolved in 
1536 show that they made provision for sheltering the needy despite the absence of documentation in 
the Valor.  Table 1 presents the total number of monasteries and hospitals by net value, as well the 
number of these houses and hospitals that the Valor lists as giving no poor relief. 
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Table 1    Number of Religious Houses and Hospitals Recorded in the Valor as Not Providing Charity 














Under £50  114  88  66  37 










£100-£149  70  35  4  1 
£150-£199  45  18  5  1 
£200-£299  62  20  2  0 
£300-£499  48  11  3  1 
£500-£999  35  7  2  0 
>£1000   21  1  0  0 
Total  493  235  89  42 
 
NOTE    Table does not include the sixty-nine houses in Berkshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, 
Hertfordshire, Northumberland, Rutland and parts of Yorkshire for which no details of gross income or 
expenses are available. 
 
 
.   
 
THE EFFECT OF THE VALOR COMMISSIONS ON THE POOR-RELIEF RECORDS    The commissions that 
were to carry out the valuation of ecclesiastical income were appointed in 1535. They usually consisted 
of various members of the county gentry, as well as such local officials as justices of the peace.  Apart 
from the appropriate bishop, clerical personnel were conspicuous by their absence. The commissioners 
owed their allegiance to the Crown and to Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell, who was most likely 
planning the Dissolution.  Cromwell’s central government machine was clearly keeping tight reins on the 
progress of the survey. Although his letters to the commissions did not survive, those written to him from 
the field indicate that he was demanding constant updates.
10  
  The commissioners were keen to assure Cromwell that everything was being done to maximize 










exceeding the interpretations of the statutes.” Letters from Thomas Tempest and George Lawson, the 
Yorkshire commissioners, are particularly replete with such assurances. This attitude was bound to have 
an effect on the valuation of alms provision by the investigated religious houses and could well account 
for much of their under- or nil assessments.
11 
  According to the Valor, only small amounts of monastic charity were dispersed in the counties 
of Staffordshire, Bedfordshire, and Devon. Staffordshire and Bedfordshire have only six houses 
between them (out of twenty-six) recorded as supplying something, albeit little, and three Devon houses 
and one hospital (out of nineteen) are credited with small amounts. However, a closer inspection of the 
evidence from Devon suggests that the reason for the apparent lack of monastic charitable provision in 
this county was due either to a misunderstanding or a deliberate failure to acknowledge the instructions 
from central government by the appointed commissioners. William Courtenay, one of the heads of the 
Devon commission, was involved in a conflict with two religious houses in Devon and Cornwall -- 
Hartland Abbey and Launceston Priory-- during the first half of 1535 while the survey was in progress. 
On Cromwell’s authority, he received money for his part in the deposition of both heads of these 
houses, but was aggravated to find that Thomas Arundel had beaten him to a greater part of the goods 
and livestock of Hartland Abbey: “Since the last abbot was deposed he has conveyed away the plate of 
the house by means of Sir Thomas Arundell, and no corn is left. There are not four ploughs where there 
were six or seven. Of 1,000 sheep there is not 4, of 50 kine not 13, and of 100 other cattle not 
threescore.”










That Humphrey Prideaux and Hugh Yeo, justices of the peace and Courtenay’s fellow survey 
commissioners, were refused entry into Hartland Abbey two months later, after Arundel’s men had 
reinstated the old abbot and garrisoned the walls, indicates the level of antagonism that existed between 
the religious community and the commission in Devon.  Evidently, Courtenay was attempting to install 
Cromwell’s men as heads of houses. Furthermore, the Devon returns display a greater degree of 
stringency in regard to tax reprisals (and poor relief) than any other county. The exact date of the 
evaluation of Hartland Abbey is not known, but from a gross income of £306 3s. 2¼d. little more than 
£13 was allowed as reprisals, none of it for poor relief. Depending on the date of the survey, either 
Courtenay’s commission was taking liberties against the recalcitrant abbot or Cromwell’s/Courtenay’s 
newly installed puppet-abbot was allowing the maximum amount of tax to be extracted from the Abbey. 
A similar refusal to allow reprisals is evident in all the Devon returns.  An average of just over 5 percent 
of the gross income in Devon escaped taxation -- a lower proportion than for the rest of the country. At 
several of the Devon houses, the only reprisals permitted against tax were for the fees of the very 
commissioners who were conducting the survey.
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  The implications for any assessment of the poor relief efforts of the Devon monasteries are 
evident. Contrary to instructions from the exchequer, the county commissioners were not honoring 
charitable provision. No other county commission was as thorough in its non-recording of monastic 
charity, though many other counties also had an unlikely number of houses recorded with no, or with 










contrast to others, were entirely devoid of monastic charity.  Closer inspection, however, reveals that 
the areas in question correspond to the deaneries that served as administrative units for certain members 
of the commission--Yarborough, Grimsby, Walshcroft, and Wraggoe.  Hence, their apparent lack of 
poor relief is more than likely an artifact of under-recording by the six commissioners (out of a total of 
thirty-one appointed for the county) designated to survey these deaneries. Thornton Abbey, one of the 
wealthiest of them, enjoyed a net income of £594 17s. 2¾d., though, according to the Valor, it had no 
charitable obligations.
14  
  Any assessment of the quantity of monastic poor relief derived from the Valor must first control, 
as much as possible, for the characteristics of the commissions that made the evaluations. This caveat 
does not necessarily imply negative control in every instance.  The commissioners who belonged to the 
families who founded monasteries, and often still had relatives within them, were hardly likely to have 
been hostile to them.  In the northern counties, the Pilgrimage of Grace, the only popular rebellion at 
least partly inspired by the Dissolution of the lesser houses, was instigated with the collusion of several 
members of the conservative gentry. Ultimately, however, the political environment of 1535 did not 
make for a commission sympathetic to the fair taxation of the religious houses.
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QUANTIFYING THE EVIDENCE FOR MONASTIC POOR RELIEF IN THE VALOR    Table 2 shows the 
corrected analysis of the basic data for poor relief as recorded in the Valor.  If the raised figure of 4.93 










providing no poor relief, then a figure of £7,403 is yielded from the total monastic net income of £142 
834 recorded in the Valor.
16  
 
Table 2   Basic Data Relevant to Poor Relief as Recorded in the Valor, Correcting Savine’s Analysis 
RELIGIOUS HOUSES 
RECORDED AS 
SUPPLYING POOR RELIEF 
TOTAL POOR RELIEF 
RECORDED  
AVERAGE POOR RELIEF 
PER RELIGIOUS HOUSE 
AVERAGE PROPORTION 
OF POOR RELIEF PER 
RELIGIOUS HOUSE 
306  £5218  £17.05  5.33% 
With all zero poor relief 
houses worth >£50 
added 
     
431  £5218  £12.11  4.93% 
 
 
  Submitting the data to these kinds of readjustment yields a proportion of monastic poor relief to 
income in 1535 that roughly doubles Savine’s estimates. But these changes do not give proper attention 
to an important concern.  The calculations in Table 2 correct for the methodology of Savine’s figures 
and attempt to deal, at least to some extent, with the issue of underassessment, but this correction 
implies that the selected sample of houses -- those with non-zero poor relief or those with net incomes 
less than £50 -- have accurate records and that the excluded ones do not. As previously noted, it is 
likely that commissioner subjectivity had a substantial impact on the recording of all charitable reprisals, 










the potentially important issue of underassessment, we propose a statistical methodology that seeks to 
model underassessment and to correct for it.  
First, assume that actual poor relief can be represented as: 
      ai = Xi b1  + e1i .                       (1) 
In addition, assume that the value of poor relief recorded in the Valor for each religious house can be 
represented as: 
      ai* = Xi b1 + g(Zi g)b2 + e2i ,                                     (2) 
where the Xi are house and county specific characteristics that should be associated with the actual level 
of poor relief of house i, the Zi are house- and county-specific characteristics for house i that should be 
associated with the level of poor relief recorded in the Valor, but not actual poor relief. The function g( 
) relates the various Zi variables to some measure of bias. Finally, the e1i  and e2i  are iid, standard 
normal disturbances. Taking expected values in equation (2) and using the fact from equation (1) that 
E(Xi b1) = ai , we can write: 
       E(ai*) =  E(Xi b1) +E[g(Zi g)]b2 =  ai  + E[g(Zi g)b2].                                  
(3)   
This third equation shows that the expected value of ai* is actual poor relief, ai, plus a function of 
characteristics that should not be associated with actual charitable provision, a bias function.   
The idea behind our estimation strategy is to model g(Zi g) and estimate the second equation. If 










individual religious house. In other words, we calculate an estimated value of poor relief in a situation 
where bias, g(Zi g), is eliminated by setting it equal to zero. This estimation strategy also provides a test 
of the importance of bias. If the coefficient b2 is not significantly different from zero, we can conclude 
that either our bias function is improperly specified or that little systematic bias appears in the recording 
of poor relief in the Valor.       
 
SPECIFYING THE BIAS FUNCTION    To proceed with the proposed estimation strategy, we need to 
develop a bias function and, hence, both a reasonable measure of bias and a set of variables that would 
influence recorded but not actual almsgiving.  From the foregoing discussion, the attribution of zero poor 
relief in the Valor is a good house-level indicator of bias -- at least for those houses with a net income in 
excess of £50.  Moreover, the internal evidence in the Valor and the recorded grant of commissions 
provide information about the size and the structure of the county-specific commissioning bodies that 
were responsible for auditing the religious houses. Unfortunately, since the names of the individual 
commissioners who evaluated particular houses are available only for Lincolnshire and a few other 
counties, this study must rely on general county-level measures for the characteristics of the auditors. 
Nevertheless, it seems highly unlikely that the size or structure of a particular commissioning body, or its 
tendency to undervalue other houses in the county, would be at all related to actual poor relief.  
Moreover, the measures used herein should be able to capture at least some of the variation in 
commissioners’ subjectivity or their tendency to underrecord.










  The first stage is to estimate g(Zi g) as a probit function relating county and commission-specific 
measures to whether or not a particular house was recorded in the Valor as giving zero poor relief. In 
this probit model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of zero-recorded poor relief. 
Parameter estimates with positive (negative) signs reflect a higher (lower) probability of zero poor relief 
when the associated variable takes on larger values. The regressors are only those characteristics that 
seem to bear no relation to actual charitable provision. If there were no systematic bias on the part of 
the commissioners, the parameter estimates associated with the Z variables -- the g vector in our 
notation -- should be insignificant. Table 3 presents the set of Z variables chosen for our bias function, 
along with their definitions, means, and standard deviations. 
Table 3   Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables Used in the Bias Function 
VARIABLE   DEFINITION  MEAN  
(STANDARD 
DEVIATION) 
Diocesan bishop  =1 if the county’s commission included a bishop  0.617 
(0.49) 
Titled (knights of the 
realm) 
The number of titled individuals in the commission  7.043 
(4.89) 
Percent titled  The deviation of the percentage of titled people in 
a particular commission from the average 
percentage in all other commissions. 
-.001 
(0.11) 
Commissioners  The deviation of the number of commissioners 






The ratio of the number of commissioners to the 
number of religious houses in the county 
1.298 
(0.95) 
Percent zero  The percentage of other houses in the county with 












Other reprisals  The amount of other reprisals the house was 





  The variables chosen include several measures of the characteristics of the commissioners 
assigned to each county. We consider the composition of the commissioning bodies by position and 
social class of the commissioners. Given that houses were not assessed by the whole commissioning 
body but evaluated by teams of four to six men, a measure of the ratio of commissioners to houses 
provides a rough probability of any one particularly hostile or particularly fair commissioner being 
assigned to assess a given house. An extremely hostile commissioner would have had the chance to 
underassess a few houses only if there were a large number of commissioners to be assigned. The 
county-level variables are the same for all religious houses within a particular county.  Two house level 
measures -- the extent to which the group of commissioners underassessed all other religious houses in 
the same county and how much they allowed for other reprisals against taxation for any given house—
are also included. These two measures may well be important indicators of bias, because commissioners 
intent on maximizing the Crown’s taxable income would likely have underestimated other religious 
houses and other categories of nontaxable income. The percentage of other religious houses recorded 
as providing no charity may indicate the extent to which a commission was likely to undervalue in 
general, and the allowance of other reprisals against taxation should capture the general attitude of the 










  An important issue in the attempt to estimate this bias function is the extent to which the chosen 
variable actually captures underassessment and not real poor relief. The measure of reprisals as a 
percentage of gross income may be a problematic regressor in the bias function, because it may 
somehow proxy for a house’s income level -- its ability to provide poor relief at all. If the houses with 
the largest percentage of gross income earning reprisals were, on average, the houses with the highest 
incomes, it is possible that our reprisal measure is associated with high poor relief. However, houses that 
earmarked a large percentage of their gross income for other reprisals against taxation might not have 
had much income available for charity. The latter seems the more probable scenario; regression analysis 
(results not shown herein) demonstrates that, on average, low-income houses had a higher percentage 
of income allocated toward reprisals. 
Because the association between reprisals and income level is negative, high levels of other 
reprisals as a percentage of gross income -- if capturing income effects in our probit specification -- 
would appear to make the level of poor relief lower and zero poor relief more likely. Hence, a positive 
coefficient would mean that houses with a high percentage of gross income allotted for other expenses 
would have less income to spend on charity, indicating that our measure of other reprisals is capturing 
ability to provide poor relief and should not be included in the bias function. On the other hand, if the 
level of reprisals is to be more associated with commissioner subjectivity, a negative correlation between 
other reprisals and low poor relief (or zero poor relief, as in our probit specification) would be more 










  Another important consideration involving the bias function is that since those houses with a net 
value less than £50 were probably unable  to make charitable donations, their zero assessments in the 
Valor may be valid. To allow for this possibility, our bias functions are estimated with the full sample of 
houses and a sample of only those houses with a net worth greater than £50 .. Results from both 
versions of the probit model are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4   Parameter Estimates for the Probability of Zero Poor Relief, as a Function of Commission- 
and House-Specific Characteristics that Should not be Associated with Actual Poor Relief  
VARIABLE NAME  FULL SAMPLE 
(N=582) 
INCOMES OVER £50 
(N=402) 



















































 Log-likelihood  -358.97  -229.35  
NOTE    The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 
county-level. 
 
  Notice that the coefficients are all, with the exception of the bishop indicator and the average 
number of commissioners to houses (which is borderline significant), significantly related at conventional 
levels to having been recorded in the Valor as providing no poor relief -- a measure that we believe 
implies underassessment. In order to determine whether these variables are proxies for variations in 
house-level characteristics across counties, we estimated these probit functions using all of the 
commissioner and house-level characteristics (both the Z and the X variables). The coefficients on the Z 
variables were little changed by the inclusion of variables that should influence charitable provision. In 
other words, these coefficients are not likely to be picking up actual variations in house-level 
characteristics (at the county level) that should be associated with actual poor relief.
18    
  In either sample,  those houses audited by commissions with a higher percentage of titled 
members.  were  less likely to be recorded as zero–poor relief houses, though this relationship reverses 










  Similarly, for the full sample, a larger than average number of commissioners is associated with a 
high probability of zero-recorded poor relief, whereas in the restricted sample the relationship 
reverses.
19   
  All other relationships take the expected signs and remain consistent across samples. A high 
ratio of commissioners to houses reduces the probability of a house having been recorded as providing 
no charity. As mentioned above, this observation may reflect the fact that a high ratio of commissioners 
to religious houses reduces the probability that extremely biased individuals were involved in the 
assessment any one house. Moreover, the more houses within a given county that are underassessed, 
the higher the chances are that another house within that county will be underassessed as well. Finally, 
as expected, those commissions that were generous with other reprisals -- that is, they allowed a higher 
percentage of gross income to be written off as reprisals against taxation -- were less likely to allow no 
reprisals for charitable giving. This finding strengthens our hypothesis that the variable is capturing 
commissioner subjectivity and not operating as an income proxy --a source of actual poor relief -- that 
should be excluded from the bias function. The significance of these measures, which should in no way 
be related to actual charitable provision, provides convincing evidence of systematic measurement error 
in poor relief as reported in the Valor.  
 
PREDICTING POOR RELIEF IN THE ABSENCE OF BIAS    The second stage is to estimate equation (2), 










function.  We estimate equation (2) as an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which the standard 
errors are corrected for clustering at the county level. Once again, we estimate the model using both the 
full sample and a subsample restricted to only those houses worth more than £50..
20 
At first glance, this two-stage estimation technique appears similar to a technique developed by 
Heckman to correct for sample selection, but it differs in two important ways.  First, we introduce the 
predicted probability of zero alms in the second stage of the estimation rather than as a function of it – 
the inverse Mill’s ratio suggested by Heckman.  Second, our bias function is not meant to correct for a 
truncation of the error term caused by the utilization of only non-zero observations.  On the contrary, we 
posit that our predicted probability captures the level of bias on the part of the commissioning bodies 
and attempt to remove it from the estimated equation.
21 
Additional house- and county-level variables thought to be associated with the actual level of 
charitable provision are also included in this regression and are presented along with their definitions, 
means, and standard deviations (for the full sample) in Table 5. Urban areas usually have larger 
populations requiring assistance, and therefore face a higher demand for poor relief. Because houses 
located in urban areas during the early sixteenth century may also have experienced high levels of in-
migration, and the resultant migrant poverty, they may have had to provide more charity than houses 
outside the cities. Similarly, houses located in counties with large cities may also have attracted a 
substantial volume of migration, along with a corresponding demand for charity.










Other characteristics of the houses themselves -- the type of religious order, its location, or the 
gender of the inmates -- may have had an impact on how members prioritized spending. Houses with 
higher income should have been able to provide more poor relief than houses with lower income, and 
the ratio of a given house’s income to the county average should indicate both excess need within the 
county and the relative importance of that house. Although income is undoubtedly an important 
determinant of the level of poor relief, indicators are included for the top and bottom 30 percent of the 
income distributions only. This strategy is meant to mitigate the impact of any undervaluing of income 
that may have occurred, as well as the impact of heteroskedascity -- a problem that arises with the use 
of more refined income categories. 
Table 5  Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations of Regressors Used in OLS Regression of 
Recorded Poor Relief 
VARIABLE  DEFINITION  MEAN 
(STANDARD 
DEVIATION) 





Large urban town  =1 if the religious house is located in one of the 









=1 if the house is a female house 
0.359 
(0.48) 




Small income  =1 if the value of the house falls in the lower 30% 












Urban towns in county  the number of large towns (defined as one of the 









Income ratio  the ratio of the house’s value to the average value 
of all other houses in the county. 
1.180 
(2.09) 
Predicted value of no 
poor relief 
as a function of commission characteristics only -




a The term urban has no distinct referent at this date. This study defines urban environment as any 
settlement with more than eighty taxpayers, as listed in the Lay Subsidy tax assessment of 1524/25. 
Settlements with fewer taxpayers that show evidence of urban characteristics (mainly according to the 
VCH) have also been taken into account. Because taxpayers do not necessarily represent all heads of 
household, household multipliers using subsidy lists are liable to error in terms of settlement size and 
function. Many locations with fewer than eighty taxpayers might have had higher populations than those 
with more than eighty taxpayers, and also displayed urban characteristics. But our working definition at 
least gives a viable grouping of urban and nonurban settlements for religious houses and hospitals 
recorded in the Valor. For the lay subsidy lists, see J.  Sheail, The Regional Distribution of Wealth in 
England as Indicated in the 1524-25 Lay Subsidy Returns (1998). For the most recent discussion of 












b London and the fifteen largest provincial towns, by taxpayers, in the 1524/25 Lay Subsidy, also 
including Newcastle, which was not in the subsidy but probably the fourth largest town in the country, as 
well as York and Coventry, which were certainly underassessed. 
c The forty largest towns from the 1524/25 Lay Subsidy plus Newcastle. 
d Essentially the highland zone: Derbyshire, Shropshire, Linconshire, Wales, Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, 
Cheshire, Lancashire, Cumbria, Westmorland, and Durham. 
 
  After estimating recorded poor relief as a function of these characteristics and the predicted 
probability of having been recorded as providing zero poor relief, we estimate the value of poor relief 
assuming that bias -- the predicted probability of no poor relief -- is set equal to zero. Taking into 
account that houses of small value may have been assessed correctly in the Valor, we also run the same 
regression using a restricted sample of just those houses worth more than £50 and predicted values 
from the restricted sample probit. When we predict actual poor relief in this restricted specification, we 
use recorded values for all excluded houses and predict poor relief for only those houses included in the 
sample. The full set of parameter estimates from the OLS regression equation are presented in Appendix 
Table A, but the parameter estimates for the bias functions are presented for both specifications in Table 
6. 
Table 6   Parameter Estimates Associating Bias Function with Recorded Poor Relief  










FULL SAMPLE OLS REGRESSION  AND RESTRICTED SAMPLE OLS 
REGRESSION 
Parameter Relating Bias 






NOTE    The regression specification takes county-level clustering into account. 
 
  The parameter estimate for the bias function is negative and significant at the 1 percent level in 
either specification. This parameter estimate provides additional evidence that commission 
characteristics and commissioner bias are likely to have influenced the recorded data. In the restricted-
sample specification, our estimates imply that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent increase in the predicted 
probability that a house will be recorded as having zero poor relief translates into a £2.4 deduction in 
recorded poor relief in the Valor. Average estimated poor relief when the probability of zero-recorded 
poor relief is set equal to zero and its percentage of net income is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7  Average Predicted Poor Relief, Bias Function Set Equal to Zero, and Its Predicted Percentage 
of Monastic Income  
  FULL SAMPLE PROBIT, 
AVERAGE PREDICTED POOR 
RELIEF PER HOUSE FOR THE 
FULL SAMPLE 
RESTRICTED SAMPLE PROBIT, 
PREDICTED POOR RELIEF PER 
HOUSE FOR THE RESTRICTED 
SAMPLE AND RECORDED POOR 
RELIEF FOR THE EXCLUDED 
SAMPLE 
Predicted average poor relief 
when bias [g((Zi g)] is set equal 
to zero 
£19.13  £15.32 
Predicted poor relief as a 















NOTE    Predicted values include forty-eight houses with missing data on actual poor relief. 
 
 
Notice that our choice of sample does not seem to alter our predicted values appreciably.  
When the full sample is utilized, average charitable provision amounts to approximately £19 per house. 
This estimate drops to £15 when low-income houses are excluded from the analysis, and their data is 
assumed to have been accurately recorded. But regardless of the sample used, both estimates of 
charitable provision imply that the recorded poor relief is substantially underestimated in the Valor. 
Recall that by simply correcting Savine’s analysis, charitable provision as a percentage of monastic 
income increased from 2.5 percent to nearly 5 percent. Attempting to model and correct for systematic 
undervaluation increases the estimate a further 2 to 4 percent, depending on the sample used. Because 
the lower-income houses were not likely to have provided much charity, the restricted sample estimates 
are probably more accurate; the full-sample results provide an upper bound rather than a realistic 
estimate. Using these models, the total estimated national sum of monastic/hospital poor relief from the 
Valor falls between £10,216 and 13,265.
23 
  Despite this ample evidence of inaccuracy in the Valor’s data, there are still reasons to interpret 
the results of this study with caution. First, our model specification assumes that a record of zero 
provision provides an adequate measure of bias and that the variables selected pertain to recorded but 
not actual poor relief. If the regressors in the bias function are somehow capturing county- or house-










Our choice of zero-recorded poor relief as an indicator of bias implies that houses with a higher 
probability of no poor relief were also subject to a higher level of under-recording. This underlying 
relationship cannot be verified with the data at hand. Given that the quality of some of the data has been 
brought into question, other data in the Valor may be similarly flawed. The religious houses assessed in 
the Valor, like those in Lancashire, were probably as eager to undervalue their incomes as the assessors 
were to undervalue their reprisals against taxation.  Since this study attempts to correct for the 
undervaluation of almsgiving and not the undervaluation of income, the estimated poor relief as a 
percentage of income may be biased upward. Yet, even with these caveats in mind, both contextual and 
empirical evidence support our hypothesis of asystematic measurement error in the Valor data that 
tends to underestimate poor relief.   
 
Previous historiography on this subject has relied too strongly on Savine’s estimate that religious houses 
before the Dissolution devoted about.2.5 percent of their income to poor relief. But Savine excluded 
important houses from his analysis, and he failed to use a proper measure of monastic income. By 
including all relevant religious houses and hospitals, and by using the more appropriate measure of net 
income (before reprisals of poor relief) rather than gross income, this study roughly doubles Savine’s 
calculations. This study also models commissioner bias and removes it from the estimates of charitable 
provision.  In this context, bias is defined as the predicted probability of having no poor relief recorded 










actual charitable provision. Estimating predicted poor relief when bias is zero is the way to achieve the 
greatest accuracy.   
Both stages of the analysis tend to confirm that bias on the part of the commissioners influenced 
the recorded levels of poor relief. The parameters in the probit equation are almost all significant, 
indicating the importance of the commissioners’ characteristics. Likewise, the parameter that associates 
bias (as a function of only those characteristics believed not to be related to actual almsgiving) with 
recorded poor relief is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that bias is neither 
unimportant nor random in these data. Setting the probability of zero poor relief to zero produces a 
more realistic value of relief. Our estimates suggest that actual charitable provision on the eve of the 
Dissolution amounted to about  7 percent of monastic income -- a figure far higher than the one 
calculated by Savine and subsequently perpetuated in the literature.  
  This evidence of systematic underassessment of charitable provision in the Valor is significant. It 
means that the Dissolution was more disruptive to the lives of the English poor than Savine’s figures 
would indicate, especially since the government was unable, or unwilling, to find a substitute for this 
source of aid for some time. Monastic relief was by no means negligible; its loss must have been a great 
hardship for those who had come to rely on it.  
APPENDIX: PARAMETER ESTIMATES FROM THE OLS REGRESSION OF RECORDED 
POOR RELIEF IN THE VALOR  
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